

# **Hacking the White House: Election Fraud in the Digital Age**



I thought we fixed all of this  
after the 2000 election mess?

# A Short History of Voting in the U.S.






# A Short History of Voting in the U.S.

1. DRE = Lever Machine
2. PCOS = Punch Card
3. Vote-by-mail is not private



### Legend - Polling Place Equipment


- Paper Ballot
- Paper Ballot and Punch Card
- Mixed Paper Ballot and DREs with VVPAT
- DREs with VVPAT
- Mixed Paper Ballot and DREs with and without VVPAT
- Mixed Paper Ballot and DREs without VVPAT
- DREs without VVPAT





**So how would I steal it?**


# My requirements

1. **Covert:** Paper & electronic counts must match
  2. **Cheap:** Very few accomplices if any
  3. **Assurances:** No attacks based on unclear data
  4. **Believable:** Only attack swing states
- 




# System Design Attacks

Don't scale well or are too risky:

1. Ballot Design
  2. Voter Registration & Authentication
  3. Denial of Service
  4. Physical Access
- 

# Software and Hardware Attacks

Most don't scale or have data:

- ▶ Fleeing Voter Attacks
  - ▶ Provisional Voter Attacks
  - ▶ Attacking Individual Machines
  - ▶ Attacking Vendors
  - ▶ Attacking via Wireless
- 

# X% and Presentation Attacks



**DREs Only!**

# How Flawed are the Machines?

## ▶ Very

340: Assume buf is large enough for a token

341: This would be better if it dealt[sic] with CStrings

342: rather than with fixed buffers. Gems implemented

343: this at one point.

```
#define DESKEY ((des_key*) "F2654hD4")
```




# Security seals on voting machines: a case study

**Andrew W. Appel**


Princeton University

October 26, 2010


Tamper-evident seals are used by many states' election officials on voting machines and ballot boxes, either to protect the computer and software from fraudulent modification or to protect paper ballots from fraudulent substitution or stuffing. Physical seals in general can be easily defeated, and the effectiveness of seals depends on the protocol for their application and inspection. The legitimacy of our elections may therefore depend on whether a particular state's use of seals is effective to prevent, deter, or detect election fraud. This paper is a case study of the use of seals on voting machines by the State of New Jersey. I conclude that New Jersey's protocols for the use of tamper-evident seals have been not at all effective. I conclude with a discussion of the more general problem of seals in democratic elections.




# Attacking the EMSs



# My Final Plan




# My Final Plan







# My Final Plan



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# My Final Plan




# My Final Plan

State	Votes Shifted	New Obama/Biden Total	New Romney/Ryan Total	Margin
CO	79,139	1,283,428	1,224,620	-2.3%
NV	46,932	507,907	487,033	-2.1%
OH	186,067	2,734,588	2,754,440	0.4%
PA	207,871	2,886,339	2,784,369	-1.8%
VA	19,295	1,962,172	1,832,170	-3.4%


**So how do we fix this?**



# The Short Term

- ▶ Paper Trails and Audits
  - ▶ Parallel Testing
  - ▶ Buddy System and Security on EMS
  - ▶ No wireless components
- 

# The Long Term

- ▶ Balance Usability, Cost and Transparency with Precinct Systems
  - ▶ Be wary of Privacy on Remote Voting
  - ▶ We are not ready for internet voting!
  - ▶ IPSnail
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**Time for Q&A!**

